Settlement of the Question of Hong Kong by Wesley-Smith, Peter




On September 26, 1984 the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the
Question of Hong Kong' was initialled in Beijing. It was signed by
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Premier Zhao Ziyang on
December 19, 1984 and ratifications were exchanged on May 27,
1985. The following month, the declaration was jointly registered
by the parties with the United Nations under Article 102 of the
Charter. By virtue of the Joint Declaration and the Hong Kong Act
passed in April 1985, British sovereignty and jurisdiction over
Hong Kong will cease in 1997.2 Hong Konga will then be trans-
formed from a British colony into a Special Administrative Region
(SAR), governed in accordance with a Basic Law to be promul-
gated in 1990 under the ultimate authority of the Government of
the People's Republic of China.
* B.A., LL.B. (Add.), Ph.D. (H.K.); Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Hong
Kong.
1. The agreement, referred to in this paper as the Joint Declaration, is entitled "A
Draft Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of
Hong Kong," 1984 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 2352 (Cmd. 20). The basic documents, along with a
chronology of events, bibiliography, notes on Hong Kong's present constitutional structure
and an essay on the Joint Declaration are contained in the Hong Kong booklet 5 CONSTITU-
TIONS OF DEPENDENCIES AND SPECIAL SOVEREIGNTIES (Blaustein & Blaustein eds. 1985).
References generally in this Article to the "British" or "Great Britain" are to the representa-
tive government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. References
to "China" or the "Chinese" are to the Government of the People's Republic of China
(PRC).
2. See Wesley-Smith, The Hong Kong Act 1985, Pun. L. 122 (1986).
3. Hong Kong presently consists of Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territo-
ries. Originally, these were three separate areas. They are treated as one in this paper and in
the Joint Declaration.
Great Britain has "ownership" of two of the areas in question but only a leasehold interest
in the New Territories. Prior to the Joint Declaration, the British had expressed an interest
in enforcing their "legal right" to Hong Kong Island and Kowloon, even though the entire
area had always been administered as a single colony. This idea was abandoned, however,
when it became apparent that the stability of Hong Kong as an international financial and
investment center would not be maintainable if divided. How Britain Fell for the Peking
Game Plan, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 21, 1984, at 44. Hong Kong is currently one of the
world's largest financial centers. It is maintained as a free port and gold trading center that
supplies the PRC with approximately one-third of its foreign trade. Lohr, The Cloud Over
Hong Kong, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1983, see. VI, at 26.
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This Article will discuss four issues with regard to the Joint Dec-
laration: first, the significance of these events for the concept of
self-determination in international law; second, the precedents for
this type of treaty; third, what can be learned about China's atti-
tudes towards sovereignty and unequal treaties; and fourth, the pos-
sibility that the status quo in Hong Kong could have been preserved
after 1997 without resort to a treaty at all.4
I. SELF-DETERMINATION
The people of Hong Kong were not consulted during negotiations
which resulted in the Joint Declaration. 5 Even the Hong Kong Gov-
ernment, in which citizens had no electoral participation, was de-
nied any role in the treaty-making process. The Governor played a
part, but solely as a member of the British negotiating team. Any
suggestion that he "represented" the people of Hong Kong was
firmly denounced by Chinese spokesmen.6 There was to be no
"three-legged stool:" The future of Hong Kong was settled by the
governments of China and the United Kingdom alone. The terms of
the Joint Declaration were debated in the territory's Legislative
Council, the members of which were all ex officio or appointed. An
"assessment office" then reported on the responses of the Hong
Kong public. But there was no referendum, poll or direct vote, and
inhabitants were presented with the draft on a "take it or leave it"
basis. Thus, six million people were delivered from British colonial
rule to Chinese communist rule without any formal voice in the
process.
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights declares in Article 1 that "[a]ll peoples have the right of
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
4. Other issues are considered in Mushkat, The Transition from British to Chinese
Rule in Hong Kong, 14 DEN. J. INT'L LAW & POL'Y 171 (1986).
5. The agreement itself consists of a Joint Declaration and three annexes, accompanied
by two brief memoranda. The Joint Declaration is a general outline of the parties' intent for
the future of Hong Kong. The annexes specify means for the implementation of the plan
while the memoranda deal with the citizenship of those presently residing in Hong Kong. See
Blaustein & Blaustein, supra note 1.
6. Hong Kong, as a Crown Colony, presently continues to be ruled by the Governor
who is appointed by the Crown. HONG KONG LETTERS PATENT 1917-1976, art. 1. The Gov-
ernor appoints an Executive Council which enacts laws with the aid and consent of the Leg-
islative Council. The Executive Council of four ex officio members and a number of official
or unofficial members, all of whom are appointed by the Crown or the Governor. HONG
KONG ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS 1917-1977, art. If. The Governor also appoints the Legislative
Council which is of a similar structure to that of the Executive Council. Id. art. XIII, V 1.
See Blaustein & Blaustein, supra note 1, at 31-51.
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their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development." These same words appear in the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.7 Declarations made
by the United Kingdom relevant to Hong Kong regarding these
covenants reserve the right not to acknowledge various paragraphs
relating to an elected legislature, employment of married women,
deportation of aliens and so on. However, no reservations are ex-
pressed concerning the right of the people of Hong Kong to self-
determination. Section XIII of annex I to the Joint Declaration
confirms that the provisions of the covenants "as applied to Hong
Kong shall remain in force."' Yet the right to self-determination
obviously has been excluded.
There can be no doubt that the inhabitants of Hong Kong make
up a distinct community. Hong Kong Island has been occupied by
the British since 1841, Kowloon since 1860 and the New Territo-
ries since 1899.9 The influence of Chinese government has been rig-
orously excluded in each portion of the territory since the date of
British occupation. 10 The political, constitutional and legal systems
in Hong Kong have scarcely changed since the beginning of British
rule. The boundaries of the territory are clearly defined. The eco-
nomic system-a rather unabashed form of laissez-
faire-unmistakably differentiates the colony from its mainland
neighbor.
Many inhabitants are refugees from poverty or an uncongenial
government across the border and, while attached culturally and
psychologically to China, the inhabitants have no desire to become
subject to the political and economic systems currently prevailing in
7. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
8. Section XIII of the Joint Declaration guarantees the continued freedoms of "the
person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, to form and to join trade unions,
of correspondence, of travel, of movement, of strike, of demonstration, of choice of occupa-
tion, of academic research, of belief, inviolability of the home, the freedom to marry and
right to raise a family freely." Also guaranteed is the right to confidential legal advice and
free access to the court system. Not only is freedom of religion permitted, but this section
specifies that the "relationship between religious organizations in the ... [SAR] and those in
other parts of ... China shall be based on the principles of non-subordination, non-interfer-
ence and mutual respect."
9. In 1841, British forces occupied Hong Kong Island and a civil administration was
established although the Treaty of Nanjing was not signed until 1842 and not ratified until
1843. Kowloon was ceded by the Convention of Beijing 1860. The New Territories was
leased by the Convention of Beijing 1898, though the district was not formally occupied by
the British until April, 1899.
10. See Wesley-Smith, The Proposed Establishment of a "China Office" in Hong
Kong, 19 J. ORIENTAL STUD. 42 (1984).
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the People's Republic. Although ninety-eight per cent of Hong
Kong's population is Chinese, the inhabitants are in some ways cul-
turally distinct from most mainlanders." For example, they are
predominately Cantonese, their ability to speak putonghua (Man-
darin) is limited, they retain some traditional cultural ideas which
have been suppressed in China proper, and at the same time they
have acquired some Western notions due to their greater exposure
to the outside world. In addition, the colony has proven to be a
viable economic entity on its own. It plays a significant role in the
world economy and, while small geographically, it is much larger
than many independent states in terms of population.1"
There would thus seem to be ample grounds for according to the
people of Hong Kong the right to determine for themselves the fu-
ture status of their territory. The choice would be among indepen-
dence, free association or integration with an existing independent
state, or some other arrangement. By General Assembly Resolution
1514 (XV) of 1960, integration should only be permitted in accor-
dance with the freely expressed wishes of the people after they have
attained an advanced stage of self-government. General Assembly
Resolution 1514 (XV) confers a right on peoples suffering from
alien subjugation, domination and exploitation to obtain complete
independence. The United Nations Special Comittee on Colonial-
ism has in practice strongly favored independence among the vari-
ous options for colonial peoples." The International Court of Jus-
tice has stated that decolonialization, in particular "automatic
retrocession," must not derogate the genuine desires of the people
whose right of self-determination takes priority over claims to his-
toric title. 14 Some scholars claim that this is a clear rule-jus
cogens no lessi-in a decolonialization situation. Yet the non-
self-governing community of Hong Kong was allowed absolutely no
say in the determination of the territory's status after the cessation
11. See Baker, Life in the Cities: The Emergence of Hong Kong Man 95 CHINA Q.
469 (1983).
12. Lohr, supra note 3.
13. See M. POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE 25 (1982).
14. Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12. See Franck, The Stealing of
the Sahara, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 698, 709-11 (1976).
15. Jus cogens denotes "a peremptory norm of general international law from which
no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character." Jus cogens is cogent or compelling law as
distinguished from jus dispositivum, that is, yielding law. GAMBOA, A DICTIONARY OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY 164 (1973).
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of British jurisdiction.
This type of situation was accepted in 1972 when the Chinese
Ambassador to the United Nations objected to the topic of Hong
Kong (and Macao) being on the agenda of the Special Committee.
He stated:
As is known to all, the questions of Hong Kong and Macao
belong to the category of questions resulting from the series of
unequal treaties left over by history, treaties which the imperial-
ists imposed on China.
Hong Kong and Macao are part of Chinese territory occupied
by the British and Portuguese authorities. The settlement of the
questions of Hong Kong and Macao is entirely within China's
sovereign right and does not at all fall under the ordinary cate-
gory of colonial territories.
Consequently, they should not be included in the list of colonial
territories covered by the declaration on the granting of indepen-
dence to colonial countries and people.
With regard to the questions of Hong Kong and Macao, the
Chinese government has consistently held that they should be set-
tled in an appropriate way when conditions are ripe. The United
Nations has no right to discuss these questions. 7
The Special Committee thereupon deleted Hong Kong and Macao
from its list of subjects to be discussed.
The right of self-determination thus proved illusory for the peo-
ple of Hong Kong. As a right in international law, it is, of course,
controversial and ambiguous. It states the problem but provides no
solution. 18 Sir Ivor Jennings said the debate over self-determination
is ridiculous because "the people cannot decide until somebody de-
cides who are the people." 19 Identification of the "self" is the pri-
mary issue: There are no objective criteria with the result that
other claims, such as historic title, the territorial integrity of a con-
tiguous state or the illegality of the previous cession, can overwhelm
"self-hood" asserted by residents of a political and territorial unit.
Additionally, the precedents did not favor Hong Kong: Goa, Belize,
Gibraltar, Western Sahara, Falklands/Malvinas and even (eventu-
ally, it seems) the brutal Indonesian annexation of East Timor, all
17. Reprinted in I J. COHEN & CHIU. PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
DOCUMENTARY STUDY 384 (1974).
18. Toynbee, Self-Determination, 484 Q. REV. 319, quoted in M. POMERANCE, supra
note 13, at 5.
19. 1. JENNINGS, THE APPROACH TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 55-56 (1956), quoted in
Pomerance, The United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives on the Wilsonian Con-
ception, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 16 (1976).
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demonstrate that the sympathies of the United Nations tend to be
with neighboring States where small colonial territories are
concerned.20
Michla Pomerance concludes her recent study entitled Self-De-
termination in Law and Practice by recognizing the necessity of a
flexible approach to self-determination claims, one which balances
conflicting principles, maximizes rights and provides a plethora of
possible solutions. "Such alternatives as federal schemes, autonomy,
minority rights, guarantees of non-discrimination, and the right of
'option' may present themselves as forms of self-determination best
suited to the particular circumstances.1 21 This is borne out by the
Hong Kong experience. The independence option was precluded,
but the Hong Kong people have been promised a high degree of
autonomy, the continuation of the territory's economic, social and
legal systems, a guarantee of basic rights and the maintenance of
links with the outside world. Whether this is ultimately satisfactory
remains to be seen. As a solution to the predicament in which Hong
Kong found itself, the Joint Declaration is perhaps the best-at
least on paper-which could be expected. 2
20. See J. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 377-84
(1979).
21. M. POMERANCE, supra note 13, at 74.
22. The Joint Declaration consists of eight paragraphs which set out the common un-
derstandings of the parties. In brief, the document makes the following provisions: The first
paragraph indicates China's desire to regain sovereignty of Hong Kong. The second para-
graph indicates Great Britain's willingness to restore China's sovereignty. Paragraph three
sets out China's twelve basic policies regarding Hong Kong. In brief they are:
1) To uphold "national unity and territorial integrity." This is to be satisfied by the estab-
lishment of a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR).
2) To allow the "region" to "enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defense
affairs."
3) To allow the "region" to be "vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial
power, including that of final adjudication." (Hong Kong law as it currently exists is to
remain basically unchanged.)
4) To allow the government positions to remain intact and to continue to be filled by local
inhabitants.
5) To allow the current "life style" and personal rights to remain unchanged.
6) To allow the "region" to "retain the status of a free port and a separate customs
territory."
7) To allow the financial status of the "region" to remain unchanged, including the currency.
8) To allow taxes and governmental finances to remain unchanged.
9) To allow the "region" to be able to establish "mutually beneficial economic relations"
with other countries (the United Kingdom being specifically mentioned).
10) To allow the "region" to be known as "Hong Kong China" and to be free to develop
economic and cultural relations with other countries as well as issue its own travel permits.
11) To allow Hong Kong to maintain its own internal police power.
12) To allow these policies to become part of the "Basic Law" of Hong Kong and remain
unchanged for fifty years.
Paragraph four declares that until the change in 1997, the United Kingdom is to remain in
1987]
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The Joint Declaration is not, however, what is normally under-
stood by self-determination.2 3 It is not the exercise of a right of
"external" self-determination, meaning the right to choose freedom
from an imposed sovereignty. Nor does it involve "internal" self-
determination, meaning a free choice of the form of government.
The Joint Declaration indicates in outline how the post-1997 gov-
ernment will be chosen, but important details are not provided;
these will be decided by the Basic Law Drafting Committee, whose
members include a minority of Hong Kong people selected by
China. No elections were held even for the Basic Law Consultative
Committee which advises the drafting body. And, in any event, the
final Basic Law will be enacted by the National People's Congress
of the People's Republic of China. Thus, while the resulting form of
government might indeed be in accordance with the freely ex-
pressed wishes of the Hong Kong people, the Hong Kong people
have not freely expressed their wishes. Even democratic self-gov-
ernment, the third and minimal strand of meaning which self-deter-
mination embraces, may not in practice be achieved.
II. PRECEDENTS
The Joint Declaration is remarkable for the detail in which
China promises to maintain the existing way of life in Hong Kong.
In a treaty with the imperialist power that illegally occupied sacred
Chinese soil and instituted a repressive exploitative regime over
Chinese compatriots, the People's Republic solemnly declares that,
while resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong, for the
next fifty years it will do virtually nothing to disturb the status quo.
The territory will become a Special Administrative Region enjoying
a high degree of autonomy with full powers of government .2  Only
foreign and defense affairs are to be the responsibilities of the Cen-
tral People's Government." The new Hong Kong authorities will
control and that China will aid it in maintaining Hong Kong's current status. Paragraph five
provides for the creation of a Sino-British Joint Liaison Group "to ensure a smooth transfer
of governments." Paragraphs seven and eight declare that the Annexes are to be imple-
mented by the parties and are to be equally binding.
23. Brownlie grants the concept "a core of reasonable certainty. This core consists in
the right of a community which has a distinct character to have this character reflected in
the institutions of government under which it lives." An Essay in the History of the Princi-
ple of Self-Determination, in GROTIAN SOCIETY PAPERS 1968: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF
THE LAW OF NATIONS 90 (C. Alexandrowicz ed. 1979). By this standard, there is arguably
self-determination for the citizens of Hong Kong despite the lack of consultation or
referendum.
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retain the ability to maintain and develop economic and cultural
relations and to conclude agreements with states, regions and inter-
national organizations. The Joint Declaration provides the follow-
ing: Rights and freedoms are guaranteed; the Hong Kong dollar
will remain the basic unit of currency; the territory will continue to
be a separate unit for customs, immigration and passport purposes;
Hong Kong courts will possess the power of final adjudication; 26
and capitalism will continue to flourish. Thus, China simultane-
ously reclaims sovereign powers and drastically limits her future
exercise of them.
This kind of arrangement is not unprecedented in treaties
whereby Great Britain has ceded territory to other powers. For ex-
ample, when Guadaloupe was ceded to Sweden in 1813, the Swed-
ish King engaged to preserve and maintain "all the privileges,
rights, benefices, and prerogatives" of the inhabitants and grant to
them the same protection and advantages enjoyed by other Swedish
subjects. The slave trade was to be outlawed, Britain's enemies
were to be excluded and British subjects were to be granted every
protection and security.27 A treaty in 1860 between Great Britain
and Nicaragua recognized Nicaraguan sovereignty over territory
claimed by the Mosquito Indians; however, the Indians were to gov-
ern the territory according to their own customs consistent with the
sovereign rights of the Republic of Nicaragua with no interference
from Nicaraguan authorities. Greytown (San Juan del Norte) was
to be declared a free port, trial by jury and religious freedom were
to be guaranteed and Mosquito land rights were to be confirmed.2 s
By an Anglo-German agreement in 1890, existing native laws and
customs in the ceded island of Heligoland were, as far as possible,
to remain undisturbed and rights of property maintained. 9 Similar
provisions were made in arrangements for the cession of Newfound-
26. The judicial system will remain as it is currently found in Hong Kong, including
its common law basis, except that there will be a final court of appeal in the SAR replacing
the Judicial Committee of Privy Council. Joint Declaration, supra note I, annex I. Annex I
goes into great detail and displays a high regard for keeping the integrity and current
method of adjudication intact.
Article 31 of the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CONSTITUTION provides that: "The state
may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted in
special administrative regions [SAR] shall be prescribed by law enacted by the National
People's Congress in the light of the specific conditions." The only changes in the existing
law of Hong Kong will be those that contravene the Basic Law; the Law of England will not
apply in the SAR. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at annex I.
27. 2 HERTSLET'S COMMERCIAL TREATIES 337.
28. 11 HERTSLET'S COMMERCIAL TREATIES 446.
29. See Anglo-German Agreement Act, [1890] 53 & 54 Vict., ch. 32.
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land to France in 190430 and of various East African territories to
Italy in 1925. 81
The most interesting precedent for the Hong Kong agreement is
the Convention for the Rendition of Weihaiwei.33 Weihaiwei, a ter-
ritory in northern China, was leased to Britain in 1898 at the same
time that the New Territories convention was negotiated.3 3 The
terms of the two 1898 agreements were very similar, but the New
Territories lease was for ninety-nine years, whereas Weihaiwei was
to be British "for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in
the occupation of Russia. '3 4 The departure of the Russians from
Port Arthur in 1905 in fact was not followed by the immediate
evacuation of Weihaiwei; rendition had to wait until 1930. In the
convention for rendition signed in 1930, the National Government
of the Republic of China agreed, inter alia, to maintain the existing
regulations including land and house tax, sanitary and building reg-
ulations, and policy; to recognize the validity of all British docu-
ments of title to land issued to Chinese owners, all leases and all
decisions of the British Weihaiwei courts; to pay fair compensation
to expropriated foreigners; to maintain existing public services and
aids to navigation; and, unless the port were closed for naval pur-
poses, to continue it as an area for international residence and
trade."
In 1977, when speculating about the future of Hong Kong, Dick
Wilson referred almost prophetically to the Weihaiwei precedent
and concluded:
Any such arrangements come to in the 1980s about the rendition
of the New Territories of Hong Kong, or of Hong Kong as a
whole, would take place in a very different climate, one in which
the Chinese would not feel obliged to give anything away that
they did not desire. Nevertheless the Weihaiwei Agreement of
1930 underlines the capacity of a Chinese government to concede
30. Anglo-French Convention Act, [1904] 4 Edw. 7, ch. 33.
31. Anglo-Italian Treaty (East African Territories Act), [1925] 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 9.
32. Convention for the Rendition of Weihaiwei, Apr. 18, 1930, Great Britain-China,
112 L.N.T.S. 49 (No. 2607). This Convention abrogated the Convention for the Lease of
Weihaiwei which was signed on July 1, 1898. Id. art. 2.
33. See P. ATWELL, BRITISH MANDARINS AND CHINESE REFORMERS 6-11 (1985); P.
WESLEY-SMITH, UNEQUAL TREATY, 1898-1997: CHINA, GREAT BRITAIN, AND HONG KONG'S
NEW TERRITORIES 26-28 (1983). 1 am grateful to Dr. Atwell for making a copy of the
typescript available prior to publication of her book.
34. Convention between China and Great Britain respecting Weihaiwei, July 1, 1898,
China-Great Britain, reprinted in 186 PERRY. THE CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERVICE 354.
35. P. ATWELL, supra note 33, at 6-11.
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de facto if it can be seen as winning de jure.36
Despite the contrasting circumstances of 1985, the Chinese Govern-
ment was still capable of compromising its resumption of sover-
eignty in an agreement with the British. The later concessions were
much more detailed and comprehensive, but they differed only in
degree, not in kind; the Joint Declaration ought not to be regarded
as sui generis."The obvious question arises: Will China respect the
promises made? It is often asserted that China's record in obeying
the letter of treaties freely entered into (and even of unequal trea-
ties like those ceding and leasing Hong Kong) is very good. In rela-
tion to Weihaiwei, China's initial compliance with the rendition
agreement could not be seriously faulted.3 8 When the port was
closed to foreigners and converted into a naval base, a possibility
envisaged by the convention, several of the concessions legitimately
lapsed. In any event, occupation of Weihaiwei by Japanese forces
in 1938 and the eventual establishment of the People's Republic of
China meant that circumstances were sufficiently changed to
render strict observance of the Sino-British treaty unrealistic. Nev-
ertheless, a foundation of specialized treaties exists on which the
Joint Declaration can rest; however, the question of China's exer-
cise of past and future sovereignty over Hong Kong is not as easily
answered.
III. SOVEREIGNTY AND UNEQUAL TREATIES
Clearly, the People's Republic of China. has regarded national
sovereignty as a fundamental principle of international law. 9 It is
less clear quite what is meant by sovereignty. Is sovereignty con-
ceived of as indivisible and can it exist where it is not exercised?
The following four propositions can be discerned from Chinese
literature: First, the theory of the divisibility of sovereignty is a
bourgeois plot to serve imperialism's quest to control foreign peo-
ples; second, unequal treaties,"' being unequal, are invalid and of
36. Wilson, New Thoughts on the Future of Hong Kong, 8 PAC.
COMMUNITY 588, 597 (1977).
37. This answers the question posed by Lucian Pye: "When before has there been an
established date of termination of colonial rule set by treaty?" See The International Posi-
tion of Hong Kong, 95 CHINA Q. 456 (1983).
38. Dr. Pamela Atwell, in a personal communication to the author, refers to favorable
comments by British officials in 1931, 1932 and 1933 concerning China's compliance with
the convention. (Copy on file at offices of CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL.)
39. See J. COHEN & CHIU, supra note 17, at 106-19.
40. Unequal treaties are "[t]reaties which are not concluded on the basis of mutual
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no legal effect; third, accordingly, sovereignty over Hong Kong
vests in China and has always done so; and fourth, sovereignty is
inseparable from its exercise.41 After their first hopes of continued
British sovereignty had been dashed, the British negotiators in Beij-
ing adopted a fall-back position and suggested recognition of Chi-
nese sovereignty in return for the maintenance of British adminis-
tration in Hong Kong. As a result, Chinese polemicists asserted this
fourth proposition. At the same time, however, Chinese leaders
have spoken of Hong Kong's return to China and the need to re-
cover or regain sovereignty, implying that sovereignty or a portion
of sovereignty does not now belong to China."2 Similarly, some
statements on the unequal treaties appear to concede their validity
while proclaiming China's unilateral right of abrogation at any
time."' Both Portugal, which administers Macao, and China agree
that sovereignty over Macao vests in China. The Joint Declaration
announces that the Chinese people aspire to the recovery of Hong
Kong and their government has decided to resume the exercise of
sovereignty over Hong Kong effective July 1, 1997-a date which
could have no conceivable significance unless the New Territories
treaty were effective and so expired on that exact date. Yet the
Chinese memorandum on nationality which accompanied the Joint
Declaration implies that "Hong Kong Chinese compatriots" have
been born in China even if born in the British colony.
The Chinese position on these issues thus seems to be equivocal.
It has previously been observed that, in international affairs, Hong
Kong can act as an "independent" factor in Chinese policy, China
being "at times forced to react to situations on an ad hoc basis in a
manner that may be out of tune with the general drift of policy." 4
This is because Hong Kong is "at once a foreign policy problem
and a domestic problem."'5 Negotiations for settlement of the
recognition of the equality and sovereignty of the contracting states, and which do not con-
tain the crucial element of reciprocity where rights are conferred and obligations imposed
P. WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 33, at 3.
41. In a recent review of Zhou Gengsheng's INTERNATIONAL LAW (1981), Chen Tiqi-
ang condemns the book's separation of sovereignty from its exercise and maintains that the
best way to encourage the struggle of subjugated peoples against oppression is to tell them
they have been deprived of their sovereignty. See CHEN TIQIANG, SELECTED ARTICLES FROM
CHINESE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 240, 251 (Chinese Soc. Int'l L. ed. 1983).
42. See Dicks, Treaty, Grant, Usage or Sufferance? Some Legal Aspects of the Status
of Hong Kong, 95 CHINA Q. 427, 437 (1983); P. WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 33, at 7-9.
43. P. WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 33, at 184-87.
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Hong Kong question in 1982-1984 reveal the same lack of consis-
tency in China's notions of international law.
IV. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE AND POST-1997 HONG
KONG
If the above statement by China to the Special Committee in
197246 is taken at face value, China apparently reserved the right
to settle the question of Hong Kong at any time, whenever condi-
tions were ripe. Since the unequal treaties were considered invalid,
they did not inhibit the free determination of Chinese policy to-
wards Hong Kong. There could be no reason to suppose that 1997,
the date of expiry of the British lease over the New Territories, was
of any significance to the Chinese government. The British govern-
ment, however, regarded that date as crucial, believing that without
a new treaty the Hong Kong authorities would have to withdraw
from the leasehold. If that were to happen, Hong Kong and Kow-
loon would have to be abandoned, for the economic stability of the
region could not be maintained without the New Territories. Thus,
in 1982, the British Prime Minister journeyed to Beijing and re-
quested a formal extension of British jurisdiction beyond 1997. The
Chinese response was entirely predictable: For political and ideo-
logical reasons, the Chinese government could agree to nothing less
than the return to China of the whole colony, the ceded as well as
leased portions. Negotiations then began for the settlement which
was announced in the Joint Declaration.
Events might have been very different had the British Govern-
ment not forced Beijing's hand. In terms of the exercise of "China's
sovereign right," 1997 might have been considered an entirely pre-
mature time for settlement of the Hong Kong question. It is gener-
ally agreed that, as supported by the extraordinary promises re-
garding preservation, stability and prosperity of the territory made
in the Joint Declaration, Hong Kong is too valuable in economic
terms to be sacrificed to ideological consistency. China had devel-
oped a successful rationale for Hong Kong's survival as a British
colony: It was a problem left over from history and would be dealt
with at an appropriate time. The Hong Kong issue could have been
ignored until it no longer served the national interest and, with
China attempting to modernize, that could have been many de-
cades into the next century. Instead, the Joint Declaration was
46. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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written, causing great uncertainty and jeopardizing the prosperity
of Hong Kong which China so values.
However, her Majesty's Government may not have been power-
less to act in the New Territories after 1997 without a formal ex-
tension of authority. 7 The Act of State doctrine in relation to the
acquisition of territory could have been relied upon. Accordingly,
despite the lapse of the Convention of Beijing 1898 and the Order
in Council which confirmed it, the Hong Kong Government could
have continued to administer the New Territories as though noth-
ing had happened. No new treaty, Order in Council, Act of Parlia-
ment nor colonial ordinance was required; the mere existence of the
government would have been sufficient. This would have been of no
concern to China for which the British occupation of Hong Kong
has always been illegal. It would have been of no concern to the
colonial courts which would have accepted the policy of the execu-
tive branch of government in this matter. Thus, instead of arrang-
ing to surrender Hong Kong, the British could have simply reas-
sured residents that business would be carried on as usual in the
future, 1997 notwithstanding.
An Act of State, according to Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton in
Salaman v. Secretary of State for India,4 ' is essentially an exercise
of sovereign power which the courts must accept without question.
It is normally accompanied by a declaration by the Crown and such
a statement is regarded as conclusive. The statement authorita-
tively determines the status of a body claiming to be a foreign gov-
ernment, 4 9 the individual sovereign"0 or a diplomat;51 whether a
47. See Wilson, supra note 36, at 598-99:
Another possibility for Britain would be simply to ignore the expiry of the lease, and
to continue after July 1997 to administer the same territory as before, pending the
Chinese government's decision to take up a bilateral resolution of the question. The
Chinese, after all, already regard the whole of Hong Kong as their own territory,
albeit under temporary administration by Britain, regardless of the distinction be-
tween cession and lease, although through its own voluntary courtesy and magna-
nimity it respects the situation as if Britain's rights were legally valid. But for all
this to be left until the last moment would be too much of a cliff-hanger from the
point of view of the brain drain and investment confidence, and it would be better
for Britain to begin tackling the question of its own legal system's view of the status
of Hong Kong after 1997 well before 1997.
48. [1906] 1 K.B. 613, 639 (Moulton, L.J.).
49. Taylor v. Barclay, [1828] 2 Sim. 213, 220, 57 Eng. Rep. 769, 771; Duff Dev. Co.,
Ltd. v. Kelantan Gov't, t924 A.C. 797, 805-06; Gov't of Spain v. Arantzazu Mendi, 1939
A.C. 256; In re Amand, [1942] 1 K.B. 445; Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler, Ltd.
(No. 2), [1967] 1 A.C. 853, 901-02.
50. Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, [1894] 1 Q.B. 149, 158; Statham v. Statham, 1912 P.
92; Sayce v. Ameer Ruler, [1952] 2 Q.B. 390.
51. Engelke v. Musmann, 1928 A.C. 433, 443, 451. The Crown may also conclusively
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state of war5 1 or a case for reprisals exists;" the boundaries of for-
eign states 4 or the extent of British territory;55 and the appropriate
entity named in a treaty.56 The usual course, if an issue of this
nature arises in judicial proceedings, is for the court to address an
inquiry to the appropriate department of government,5 7 inviting a
direct response. But indirect documentary evidence of the Crown's
decision is also acceptable." A proper statement cannot be chal-
lenged;59 if it is ambiguous or insufficient, however, the court must
interpret the certificate and decide for itself what it means.60
In the event that there is no authorized declaration by the execu-
tive government for the purposes of a particular case, alternative
documents will be relied upon.6' An Order in Council, for example,
might clearly determine a matter of state. In the Hong Kong case
of Re Wong Hon,6 the issue arose whether the Hong Kong courts
had jurisdiction over the Walled City of Kowloon, an enclave which
seemed to be excluded from the lease of the New Territories in the
Convention of Beijing 1898. More specifically, the issue was
whether the courts could properly convict a defendant of murder
whose violent act occurred within the Walled City. Two Orders in
recognize a ship as the public ship of a foreign sovereign. The Parlement Beige, [1880] 5 P.
197 (C.A.).
52. The Pelican, [1809] Edw. (App.) iv, 165 Eng. Rep. 1160, 1161; Esposito v. Bow-
den, [1857] 7 El. & BI. 763, 781, 119 Eng. Rep. 1430, 1437; Sanday v. British & Foreign
Marine Ins. Co., [19151 2 K.B. 781, 801-02, aff'd sub nom. British & Foreign Marine Ins.
Co. v. Sanday, [1916] 1 A.C. 650, 665, 669; Rex v. Bottrill exparte Kuechenmeister, [1947]
1 K.B. 41, 50.
53. The Zamora, [1916] 2 A.C. 77; The Stigstad, 1919 A.C. 279 (P.C.).
54. Foster v. Globe Venture Syndicate, Ltd., [1900] 1 Ch. 811, 813-15.
55. The Fagernes, 1927 P. 311, 324, 329. But see Holdsworth, The History of Acts of
State in English Law, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 1313, 1331 (1941).
56. Re ChungSau-nam, [1914] 9 H.K.L.R. 26, 40-42, 2 C.I.L.C. 477, 484-86; Re Un
Kin and Un Fat, [1928] 23 H.K.L.R. 34, 41.
57. The appropriate department is often the Foreign Office, but it might also be the
Colonial Office (Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, [1894] 1 Q.B. 149), the Commonwealth Rela-
tions Office (Sayce v. Amer Ruler, [1952] 2 Q.B. 390), the Attorney General's Chambers
(Engelke v. Musmann, 1928 A.C. 433), the India Office (Statham v. Statham, 1912 P. 92)
or others (e.g., a British Consul (Ober v. Shui Kee Co., [1919] 14 H.K.L.R. 39, 41, 2
C.I.L.C. 487, 489)).
58. In re Suarez, [1918] 1 Ch. 176 (Foreign Office letter to the plaintiff's solicitors);
Sultan of Johore v. Abubakar Tunku Aris Bendahar, 1952 A.C. 318, 340 (letter from the
Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Rulers of the Malay States).
59. Rex v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ex parte
Trawnik, The Times, Apr. 18, 1985 (executive certificates are not subject to judicial review).
60. The Gagara, [19191 P. 95, 102-04 (C.A.); Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 1 K.B. 456,
477; Gdynia Ameryka v. Boguslawski, 1953 A.C. 11, 43.
61. Duff Dev. Co. v. Kelantan Gov't, 1924 A.C. 797, 825; Lyons, The Conclusiveness
of Foreign Office Certificate, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 240, 271 (1946). See also Mellenger v.
New Brunswick Dev. Corp., [19711 1 W.L.R. 604, 608 (C.A.).
62. 1959 H.K.L.R. 601. See P. WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 33, at 169-71.
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Council followed the Convention of Beijing 1898. They first recited
the treaty provision that "the Chinese officials now stationed within
the City of Kowloon shall continue to exercise jurisdiction therein
except insofar as may be inconsistent with the military require-
ments for the defense of Hong Kong."6 s The second revoked this
clause and announced:
The City of Kowloon shall be, and the same is hereby declared to
be, for the term of the lease in the said Convention mentioned,
part and parcel of Her Majesty's Colony of Hong Kong, in like
manner and for all intents and purposes as if it had originally
formed part of the said Colony."
This was treated as conclusively affirming the jurisdiction of the
Hong Kong courts over events within the City. The use of Orders in
Council as Acts of State is a means, said Viscount Haldane in
Sobhuza IH v. Miller,66 of "peacefully extending British dominion,"
and it "may well be as little generally understood as it is, where it
can operate, in law unquestionable." 66
If there is no relevant Order in Council, a colonial ordinance
might be accepted as an authoritative statement by the Crown as to
a matter of state. In a dispute regarding title to property in Lagos,
the Privy Council declined to construe the treaty of cession but re-
garded a recital contained in a Nigerian ordinance as conclusive of
the treaty's effect.6 7 In the absence of an executive certificate in the
form of a letter from the Government, a statement made in court,
an Order in Council or an ordinance, the judicial approach to a
matter of state will be determined by purely factual considerations.
This is the aspect most relevant to the case of Hong Kong and the
New Territories in 1997. The New Territories Order in Council
expires with the convention and it would have been politically and
diplomatically difficult to extend it. For the same reason, an Act of
Parliament was not a feasible means of providing for British juris-
diction in the New Territories after 1997 and a colonial ordinance
could not have validly defined colonial boundaries without infring-
ing on the rule of extraterritorial legislative incompetence. 8 But,
jurisdiction could have been continued in the formerly leased terri-
63. KOWLOON CITY ORDER IN COUNCIL app. IV; LAWS OF HONG KONG 1964 re-
printed in Blaustein & Blaustein, supra note 1, at 29-30.
64. Id.
65. 1926 A.C. 518 (P.C.).
66. Id. at 525. See also Post Office v. Estuary Radio, Ltd., [19681 2 Q.B. 740, 753.
67. Oyekan v. Adele, [1957] 2 All E.R. 785, 788-89.
68. See Wesley-Smith, Extraterritoriality and Hong Kong, PuB. L. 150 (1980).
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tory simply by the Hong Kong Government declining to withdraw.
In Blackburne v. Thompson,69 Chief Justice Lord Ellenborough
considered whether certain parts of St. Domingo were "in a hostile
relation" to Great Britain. The court being unable to "decide ad-
versely to the declaration of the Sovereign upon the point . .."'
held that this was for the government to determine. But "in the
absence of any express promulgation of the will of the Sovereign
in that respect, it may be collected from other acts of the State."'"
An "Order of Council" had been issued legalizing trade with St.
Domingo:
There is no doubt great convenience in the Crown making such a
general declaration as is contained in the subsequent Order of
Council, since it saves much difficulty in ascertaining the charac-
ter of such foreign places, as have been rescued from the enemy,
or have fallen under their dominion; ... [blut Courts and juries
cannot do otherwise than decide secundum allegata et probata in
each particular case .... 7
Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton stated in Salaman v. Secretary of
State for India 7 that "[an act of State need not rest upon or be
expressed in documents. It may be evidenced by the nature of the
acts done, and the circumstances under which they were done." '
And Lord Sumner, in In re Southern Rhodesia, said:
No doubt a Proclamation annexing a conquered territory is a
well-understood mode in which a conquering Power announces its
will urbi et orbi. It has all the advantages (and the disadvantages)
of publicity and precision. But it is only declaratory of a state of
fact. In itself it is no more indispensable than is a declaration of
war at the commencement of hostilities.
7 6
Thus, if the Kowloon City Order in Council had not been made,
the court in Re Wong Hon7 7 could have come to the same conclu-
69. [1812) 15 East 81, 104 Eng. Rep. 775.
70. Id. at 91, 104 Eng. Rep. at 779.
71. Id. at 90, 104 Eng. Rep. at 779 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 93, 104 Eng. Rep. at 779-80. In this case, other orders were construed, but
the sense of the judgment would permit evidence of actual hostilities or their cessation to
decide the point.
73. [1906] 1 K.B. 613.
74. Id. at 644. "In order to ascertain what rights pass to the Crown or are retained by
the inhabitants, the courts of law look, not to the treaty, but to the conduct of the British
Crown." Oyekan v. Adele, [1957] 2 All E.R. 785, 788 (P.C.). See also Nyali, Ltd. v. Attor-
ney General, [1956] I Q.B. 1, 15.
75. 1919 A.C. 211 (P.C.).
76. Id, 239-40. See also Ex parte Mwenya, [1960] 1 Q.B. 241, 297.
77. 1959 H.K.L.R. 601.
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sion but in reliance on the prior act of the Hong Kong government
in expelling the Chinese officials from the fort. In the same way, in
the absence of a suitable document expressing the will of Her Maj-
esty's Government, the fact of a continued British presence in the
post-1997 New Territories would have been a conclusive declara-
tion that expiry of the Convention and the Order in Council was of
no consequence. The New Territories could therefore have re-
mained under the control of the Hong Kong Government without a
new treaty. If the "appropriate time" for China's intervention had
not arrived, China could not have objected, since the mysteries of
British constitutional law could be of no concern, nor interest, to
Beijing. And the Prime Minister's approach to the Chinese Govern-




By exercising her right of self-determination of the entire Chi-
nese people, China will repair one breach in her territorial integrity
and sovereignty in 1997. The treaty follows the precedent created
by the return of Britain's other leased territory in China, but it goes
further in guaranteeing to Hong Kong residents the maintenance of
a life-style unknown to their compatriots over the border. The pro-
cess is not easily explicable in terms of Chinese approaches to inter-
national law, at least if theoretical consistency is required. If not
provoked by the United Kingdom Government, China could have
waited until the arrival of the appropriate moment in history before
re-absorbing Hong Kong, without becoming entangled in conflicting
notions of sovereignty. But the treaty has been signed and ratified
and, when it is fully implemented, the question of Hong Kong will
have been finally settled.
78. An alternative to relying on the Act of State doctrine would have been to invoke
the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts. See Dicks, supra note 42, at 453-55.
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